CSP Practice Questions (2026) — Free Sample Questions with Answers

Answer: C

1. Formula: C_d = C_r × (d + LC_r) ÷ (d + LC_a).
2. Actual load center: CG at the midpoint of a 72-in crate, so LC_a = 72 ÷ 2 = 36 in.
3. Rated moment about the front axle: 5,000 lb × (16 in + 24 in) = 200,000 in-lb.
4. Derated capacity: 200,000 in-lb ÷ (16 in + 36 in) = 200,000 ÷ 52 = 3,846 lb.
5. Answer: about 3,846 lb. Confirm against the manufacturer's capacity data before lifting.

2,273 lb: Uses the full 72-in crate depth as the load center: 200,000 ÷ (16 + 72). The load center is the distance to the center of gravity, which is 36 in.

3,333 lb: Uses the simple ratio 5,000 × 24/36. This drops the 16-in axle distance that the printed moment formula includes.

3,846 lb: Correct. Rated moment = 5,000 × (16 + 24) = 200,000 in-lb; derated capacity = 200,000 ÷ (16 + 36) = 3,846 lb.

5,556 lb: Adds the axle distance to the rated load center only: 5,000 × 40/36. The 16 in also belongs in the actual moment arm, and capacity cannot rise when the load center moves out.

A longer load center increases the forward moment about the front axle, so capacity falls. Balance moments measured from the fulcrum, not from the fork face alone.

Answer: A

Rehang the door, or fit a new side-hinged door, so it swings out toward the exit: Correct. 1910.36(e) requires a door connecting a room to an exit route to be side-hinged, and to swing out in the direction of exit travel when the room is designed for more than 50 people.

Keep the inward swing and hold the door open with a magnetic hold-open during classes: A held-open door still swings against exit travel once it closes, as it may when the alarm sounds. The swing direction itself must change.

Replace the door with a sliding door that tracks along the inside wall of the room: A door connecting a room to an exit route must be side-hinged. A sliding door does not meet the rule.

Keep the inward swing and add a second inward-swinging door at the far end of the room: A second door adds a way out, but each door serving a room designed for more than 50 people must swing in the direction of exit travel.

Doors from a room to an exit route are side-hinged and, for rooms designed for more than 50 occupants or with high-hazard contents, swing in the direction of exit travel (1910.36(e)).

Answer: A

A sloping or protective system designed and approved in writing by a registered professional engineer: Correct. The Appendix B slope configurations cover excavations 20 ft deep or less. At 23 ft, the system must come from approved tabulated data or a written design approved by a registered professional engineer (1926.652(b)(3)–(4)).

Flattening the slopes to 1½:1, because the Type C slope may be used at any depth: Option 1 (1½:1) is configured per the Type C figures in Appendix B, which are also limited to 20 ft. A deeper cut still needs an engineered design.

Acceptance of the plan, because 1:1 is the maximum allowable slope for Type B soil: 1:1 is the Type B slope only for excavations 20 ft deep or less. The table does not apply at 23 ft.

Acceptance of the plan if a competent person inspects daily and after every rainstorm: Inspections are required in any case, but they do not replace a protective system that is adequate for the depth.

Appendix B sloping covers excavations 20 ft deep or less. Deeper excavations need PE-approved tabulated data or a PE design (1926.652(b)(3)–(4)).

Answer: D

Hypochlorite loses strength faster when stored near other chemicals in a warm feed room over the summer: Hypochlorite decay is a product-quality issue, not the main safety concern.

Both chemicals are corrosive and require the same type of chemical-resistant gloves: A shared PPE need is not a hazard. The danger comes from the two chemicals reacting with each other.

The combined weight of the two totes may exceed the floor rating of the containment area: Floor loading should be checked, but it is minor next to the risk of a toxic gas release.

A leak from both totes into the shared containment would mix acid and hypochlorite, releasing chlorine: Correct. Acids react with hypochlorite to give off chlorine. Incompatible chemicals need separate containment so that a leak cannot mix them.

Segregate incompatible chemicals, especially acids and hypochlorites, in separate secondary containment so a single leak cannot create a toxic release.

Answer: A

1. Formula: NPV = Σ CFₜ ÷ (1 + r)ᵗ − C₀, with r = 0.08.
2. Year 1: $40,000 ÷ 1.08 = $37,037. Year 2: $45,000 ÷ 1.08² (1.1664) = $38,580.
3. Year 3: $45,000 ÷ 1.08³ (1.2597) = $35,722. Year 4: $50,000 ÷ 1.08⁴ (1.3605) = $36,751. On the TI-30XS: 50000 ÷ 1.08 ^ 4.
4. Sum of present values = $148,091. NPV = $148,091 − $120,000 = $28,091, which is positive, so the project adds value at 8%.

$28,091: Correct. The present values of the four savings are $37,037 + $38,580 + $35,722 + $36,751 = $148,091; $148,091 − $120,000 = $28,091.

$39,939: Wrong discount exponent: it uses (1 + r)^(t − 1), so year-1 savings are not discounted.

$46,667: Discounts all four years by a single factor of 1.08, as if every saving arrived in year 1.

$60,000: Forgets the discount factor: it subtracts the cost from the undiscounted total of $180,000.

Discount each year's savings by (1 + r)ᵗ for its own year t before subtracting the initial cost. A positive NPV means the project pays back more than the required rate of return.

Answer: D

Recordable injury rate broken out by site and by month: Still a lagging measure, dominated by minor injuries that do not predict fatalities.

Days since the last lost-time injury, posted on a board at each site entrance: A lagging measure that can also discourage reporting.

Safety training hours delivered per employee each quarter: An activity count that is not linked to whether critical controls actually work.

Percent of high-energy tasks with critical controls verified in the field: Correct. Fatal events come from failed controls on high-energy hazards. Field verification of those controls is a leading measure aimed at serious-injury and fatality (SIF) precursors, which a falling recordable rate does not capture.

A falling recordable rate does not predict fatalities. Use leading indicators that verify the controls on fatal-potential (high-energy) exposures.

Answer: A

1. OR gate G1 (overpressure): P = 1 − (1 − 0.10)(1 − 0.20) = 1 − (0.90)(0.80) = 1 − 0.72 = 0.280.
2. OR gate G2 (relief system fails): P = 1 − (1 − 0.05)(1 − 0.02) = 1 − (0.95)(0.98) = 1 − 0.931 = 0.069.
3. AND gate (top event): P = 0.280 × 0.069 = 0.01932.
4. Answer: about 0.0193 per year (about 1 in 52 years). On the TI-30XS: (1 − 0.9 × 0.8) × (1 − 0.95 × 0.98).

0.0193: Correct. Overpressure = 1 − (0.90)(0.80) = 0.280; relief failure = 1 − (0.95)(0.98) = 0.069; top event = 0.280 × 0.069 = 0.0193.

0.0210: Uses the rare-event sum at the OR gates (0.30 × 0.07), which the stem excludes.

0.3297: Treats the top gate as an OR gate across all four basic events.

0.3490: Adds the two intermediate probabilities at the AND gate instead of multiplying them.

Work a fault tree from the bottom up. Multiply at AND gates, and use 1 − Π(1 − P) at OR gates; the rare-event sum overstates the result when the probabilities are not small.

Answer: A

Assess the staffing change's risks through MOC before it takes effect: Correct. Z10.0 and ISO 45001 apply management of change to organizational and staffing changes, not just hardware. Risks such as delayed emergency response, unplanned lockout and missing qualified persons must be evaluated before the change.

Refer the decision to the legal department for a liability review: Someone else's role. A liability review does not identify or control operational hazards.

Train the contractor on site procedures once the change has taken effect: Wrong timing: it leaves the gap uncontrolled during the transition.

Allow the change and track night-shift incidents for the next six months: Right action at the wrong time: it checks risk after the change instead of before it.

Management of change covers people and organizational changes too. Assess their risks before implementation.

Answer: C

1. Formula: expected annual loss (EAL) = frequency (per year) × severity ($ per event), summed over the scenarios.
2. Pump-seal fire: 0.2 × $450,000 = $90,000.
3. Tank overfill: 0.05 × $1,200,000 = $60,000.
4. Small leaks: 4 × $6,500 = $26,000.
5. Total EAL = $90,000 + $60,000 + $26,000 = $176,000 per year.

$58,667: Averages the three scenario losses (176,000 ÷ 3) instead of adding them. The expected losses of separate scenarios are summed.

$150,000: Leaves out the small leaks (4 × 6,500 = 26,000). Frequent small losses add up and must be included.

$176,000: Correct. 0.2 × 450,000 = 90,000; 0.05 × 1,200,000 = 60,000; 4 × 6,500 = 26,000. The total is 176,000 per year.

$1,656,500: Adds the severities and ignores frequency. Expected loss weights each severity by how often it occurs.

Expected annual loss = frequency × severity, summed across scenarios. It allows rare large losses and frequent small ones to be compared on one annual dollar basis.

Answer: B

Install chlorine gas detectors linked to automatic cylinder shutoff valves and a scrubber: Engineering control. It limits the size of a release but keeps the gas inventory and the hazard on site, so it ranks below substitution.

Convert to liquid sodium hypochlorite and remove the chlorine gas cylinders from the site: Correct. Substitution removes the large pressurized toxic-gas inventory, so the release scenario no longer exists. It ranks above every option that only controls the gas.

Write a cylinder change-out procedure and train operators on it every year: Administrative control. It relies on human performance and does not change the hazard.

Issue escape respirators and form an on-site team trained in SCBA use: PPE and emergency response. These are the last line of defense, and they do not protect the residential neighbors.

Hierarchy of controls: elimination → substitution → engineering → administrative → PPE. Replacing a toxic gas with a less hazardous form removes the release scenario.

Answer: C

Readings from a personal dosimeter worn by the plant's security officer on each shift: A single dosimeter is not a protective action basis; plume assessment and decisions belong to offsite authorities with field monitoring teams.

Wind direction observed at the plant, evacuating only when the wind blows from the station: Local wind is only one input; acting alone on it can send employees through the plume or onto routes officials have closed.

Protective action decisions issued by state and local officials through official alerts: Correct. For a nuclear power plant emergency, offsite response organizations (state and local government) make protective action decisions for the planning zone and announce them through the Emergency Alert System and local alerts. The facility ERP should monitor those channels and pre-plan both sheltering and evacuation.

A rule that the plant always evacuates when any emergency is declared at the station: A fixed evacuation rule ignores the official decision, which may be to shelter; early, uncoordinated evacuation can increase exposure.

Within a nuclear plant EPZ, facility ERPs follow the protective action decisions of offsite (state and local) authorities and plan for both sheltering and evacuation.

Answer: B

Quarterly storeroom inspections at each plant to remove unapproved products: Inspections find problems after the chemicals arrive; they treat symptoms rather than the uncontrolled purchasing system.

Pre-purchase approval in which EHS reviews every new chemical before it can be ordered: Correct. Controlling chemicals at the point of entry lets EHS review the SDS, consider substitution, set storage and handling requirements and block banned products before they arrive; it addresses the system cause rather than the symptoms.

Refresher HazCom training for all employees on reading labels and SDSs: HazCom training helps workers understand hazards but does not stop unapproved purchases or banned products.

A corporate list of banned chemicals emailed to every plant manager each year: A list without a purchasing control relies on memory and has already failed to prevent banned products.

Hazmat management works best when new chemicals are reviewed and approved before purchase (SDS review, substitution, storage and compatibility requirements).

Answer: B

1. Tank volume: V = πr²L = π × (4 ft)² × 24 ft = 1,206.4 ft³ (r = 8 ÷ 2 = 4 ft; TI-30XS: π × 4 x² × 24).
2. Freeboard: basin area 50 × 36 = 1,800 ft²; 4 in ÷ 12 = 0.3333 ft; 1,800 × 0.3333 = 600 ft³.
3. Total: 1,206.4 + 600 = 1,806.4 ft³.
4. Convert: 1,806.4 × 7.48 = 13,512 ≈ 13,510 gal.

9,020 gal: Gives the tank volume only (1,206.4 ft³ × 7.48) and leaves out the precipitation freeboard.

13,510 gal: Correct. V_tank = π(4 ft)²(24 ft) = 1,206.4 ft³. Rain = 1,800 ft² × (4 ÷ 12) ft = 600 ft³. Total 1,806.4 ft³ × 7.48 = 13,510 gal.

14,410 gal: Takes 110% of the tank volume and then adds the freeboard. The stated criterion is the tank's entire capacity plus freeboard.

40,580 gal: Uses the 8-ft diameter as the radius, which quadruples the tank volume (4,825.5 ft³ + 600 ft³).

A horizontal cylinder's volume is πr² times its length; use the radius, add the precipitation on the containment area, and convert to gallons at 7.48 gal/ft³.

Answer: C

1. State the formula: RR = [a/(a+b)] ÷ [c/(c+d)].
2. Exposed incidence: 18 ÷ 240 = 0.075.
3. Unexposed incidence: 9 ÷ 360 = 0.025.
4. RR = 0.075 ÷ 0.025 = 3.0.

1.7: Divides the exposed risk (0.075) by the risk for the whole cohort (27 ÷ 600 = 0.045) instead of by the unexposed risk.

2.0: Compares the raw case counts (18 ÷ 9) and ignores the different group sizes.

3.0: Correct. Exposed risk = 18 ÷ 240 = 0.075, and unexposed risk = 9 ÷ 360 = 0.025. RR = 0.075 ÷ 0.025 = 3.0, so mixing-line workers had three times the risk.

3.2: This is the odds ratio, ad ÷ bc = (18 × 351) ÷ (222 × 9) = 3.16, which suits case-control studies. A cohort gives incidence directly.

Relative risk compares incidence in the exposed group with incidence in the unexposed group. It is the measure of association for cohort studies.

Answer: D

Repeat the same course for all permit issuers: Repeats an intervention that has already failed to change practice, without learning why.

Raise the passing score on the end-of-course test: Treats the test as the problem. People who passed still do not apply the requirement on the job.

Discipline the permit issuers who are named in the audit findings: Assigns blame before the cause is known. The gap may come from staffing, the permit form or supervision.

Find why the gap persists, then revise the course or controls: Correct. "Check" found a transfer gap. "Act" requires finding its cause (for example, no available fire watch or a confusing permit form), changing the course or the system, and evaluating again.

When evaluation shows a gap, analyze its cause before you act. The fix may be in the course or in the work system, and it must be re-evaluated.