MBE Practice Questions (2026) — Free Sample Questions with Answers

Answer: B

Deny the motion, because a corporation is a citizen only of its state of incorporation.: Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) a corporation is a citizen of every state where it is incorporated AND of the state of its principal place of business, so this rule is incomplete.

Grant the motion, because the company is a citizen of Ohio as well as of Delaware.: Correct. The company's nerve center (Hertz Corp. v. Friend) is in Ohio, so it shares Ohio citizenship with the plaintiff. Complete diversity is missing, and no federal question is presented.

Deny the motion, because the company waived the objection by answering first.: Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can never be waived or forfeited; the court must dismiss whenever it appears (FRCP 12(h)(3)).

Grant the motion, because a claim arising under state law cannot be heard in federal court.: Diversity cases are almost always state-law claims; state law is not the problem. The problem is the lack of complete diversity.

Diversity requires complete diversity plus more than $75,000. A corporation is a citizen of its state(s) of incorporation and of its principal place of business (its nerve center). Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived.

Answer: B

Uphold it, because conserving landfill space is a legitimate state interest.: The goal may be legitimate, but a state may not pursue it by discriminating against out-of-state articles of commerce when nondiscriminatory means, such as limits on all waste, are available.

Strike it down, because it discriminates against interstate commerce on its face.: Correct. A law that treats out-of-state commerce worse than in-state commerce is virtually per se invalid unless the state shows no nondiscriminatory alternative can serve a legitimate local purpose (City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey).

Uphold it, because the state is acting as a market participant.: The market-participant exception applies when the state itself buys or sells, such as running its own landfill. These landfills are privately owned and the state is regulating, not participating.

Strike it down, because it violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.: Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause protects individual citizens, not corporations, so the corporate hauler cannot rely on it.

Dormant Commerce Clause: facially discriminatory state laws face a virtually per se rule of invalidity; nondiscriminatory laws get Pike balancing. Watch for the market-participant exception and congressional authorization.

Answer: D

No, because the buyer received the revocation before the seller received the acceptance.: Under the mailbox rule the acceptance took effect when mailed on March 3, before the revocation reached the buyer on March 4. When the seller received the acceptance does not matter.

Yes, and the contract was formed on March 5, when the seller received the acceptance.: An acceptance by a reasonable medium is effective on dispatch, not on receipt, so the contract was formed earlier, on March 3.

No, because the seller never promised to hold the offer open for any period.: Lack of an option only means the offer was revocable. A revocation is effective only on receipt, and the buyer accepted before receiving it.

Yes, and the contract was formed on March 3, when the buyer mailed the acceptance.: Correct. A mailed acceptance is effective on dispatch, while a revocation is effective only when received. The buyer accepted on March 3, before the March 4 revocation.

Mailbox rule: acceptance is effective on dispatch; offers, revocations and rejections are effective on receipt. (Option contracts are the main exception: acceptance is effective on receipt.)

Answer: A

Yes, because police started questioning again after he had asked for a lawyer.: Correct. Under Edwards v. Arizona, once a suspect in custody asks for counsel, police may not question him about any crime until counsel is present or he starts the talk himself. Arizona v. Roberson applies this to unrelated crimes and to officers who did not know of the request.

No, because he received new Miranda warnings and knowingly waived his rights.: A waiver obtained when police reinitiate questioning after a request for counsel is presumed invalid under Edwards, even if fresh warnings are given.

No, because the right to counsel applies only to the offense being investigated.: That describes the Sixth Amendment right, which is offense-specific. The Miranda-Edwards right under the Fifth Amendment is not offense-specific.

No, because the second detective did not know about the earlier request.: Roberson holds that the officer's lack of knowledge does not matter; the request binds all police while the suspect remains in custody.

Edwards rule: after a clear request for counsel during custodial interrogation, police may not reinitiate questioning on any offense until counsel is present, unless the suspect initiates or there has been a 14-day break in custody (Maryland v. Shatzer).

Answer: D

Exclude it, because the bystander is not available to be cross-examined about what he saw.: Exceptions under FRE 803, including excited utterances, apply whether or not the declarant is available.

Exclude it, because the person who made the statement has not been identified.: An unidentified declarant's statement can qualify if the circumstances show the declarant saw the event and spoke under its stress.

Admit it, because it is the statement of an opposing party.: The bystander is not a party or a party's agent, so FRE 801(d)(2) does not apply.

Admit it, because it is an excited utterance made under the stress of a startling event.: Correct. The statement relates to a startling event (the crash) and was made seconds later while the declarant was visibly under stress, satisfying FRE 803(2).

Excited utterance (FRE 803(2)): a statement about a startling event made while the declarant is under the stress of excitement it caused. Availability of the declarant is irrelevant for FRE 803 exceptions.

Answer: D

$0, because the cyclist was more at fault than the driver.: Barring a plaintiff who is more than 50% at fault is the modified comparative rule. Under pure comparative fault the plaintiff recovers even at 99% fault.

$120,000: This uses the cyclist's own 60% share instead of reducing the damages by it.

$200,000: This ignores the cyclist's fault entirely. Comparative fault reduces recovery in proportion to the plaintiff's share.

$80,000: Correct. Under pure comparative fault, damages are reduced by the plaintiff's percentage: $200,000 × (1 − 0.60) = $80,000.

Pure comparative fault: recovery = total damages × (1 − plaintiff's fault %). The MBE uses pure comparative fault unless the question says otherwise.